Israel and Palestine: one conflict, two wars

Unilateral disengagement from civilian occupation 

The intractable, seemingly unresolvable conflict between the warring Israelis and Palestinians is, of course, considerably more complex than the split emotions it evokes.

One side sees Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory as the source of all ills, and the other side will point at Palestinian denial of the Jewish state's right to exist as the insurmountable evil.

And sadly, both are right.

Israel's nearly fifty years of occupation of the West Bank (and previously of Gaza as well), however 'enlightened' that occupation may be considered, remains - occupation. Occupation of another people, preventing its independence and possibility of fulfilling its national aspirations, inevitably causes resistance from without, Intifada one and two …, and corruption from within. That is, an expansion of geo-political borders on the ground is accompanied by tighter security boundaries, and a loosening of internal ego-boundaries, such as those pertaining to social and political ethics.

And Palestinian rejection of the Jewish State, seeking its extinction rather than peaceful coexistence, digging tunnels of terror rather than bridges of reconciliation, makes even the most far reaching peace proposal futile, as happened in 2000 and 2006, when Arafat and Abbas rejected the agreements proposed by Barak and Olmert respectively.

When, all too rarely, there is progress in peace talks, it is counterbalanced by terror, and by settlement expansion. Likewise, stalemate between the sides is counter weighed by explosive undercurrents that await eruption.

I believe the two parallel wars – Israel’s war of occupation, and the Palestinians’ war to destroy Israel - need to be recognized, separated from each other, and dealt with differently. And the world community, which too easily gets excited when the gladiators tear each other asunder, needs to help carry the complexity, rather than take sides with either of the warring opponents, thus reinforcing the split-mindedness of the conflict.

From an Israeli perspective, I suggest the following steps to deal with the two wars:

1. Ensure security; which already is constantly on Israel’s agenda, and carried out – at a high price - with great efficiency;

2. Define a temporary border. In fact, the notorious security fence does this quite well; 9-13% of the West Bank remains west of the fence. That is, 87-90% of the West Bank remains outside the security fence, to establish a demilitarized Palestinian state with temporary, but near-complete borders.

© Shaul Arieli, http://www.shaularieli.com

3. Separate between civilian and military occupation:

a. Withdrawal from civilian occupation beyond the self-defined temporary border, and beyond the big settlement blocs; i.e., from close to 90% of the West Bank. Relocate the many small and scattered settlements - in which a minority of settlers reside, to inside the security fence, i.e., the self-defined, temporary but distinct border, preferably by offering compensation for voluntary relocation; 

b. Retain military occupation for security needs, but step by step, increase the territory handed over to Palestinian civilian authority – and eventually, as well, security control. Practical and creative solutions to ensure security cooperation can be provided – some are already implemented. Each limited territorial step, as part of a long range plan, should be accompanied by steps of mutuality, agreed upon by both sides. If no agreement, no military withdrawal, until security control can be transferred.

c. That is, unilateral civilian disengagement and withdrawal from occupied territories beyond the security fence, but negotiated step-by-step military withdrawal, with increased Palestinian security responsibility in those areas added to its sovereign territory.

4. Withdrawal from occupation, and geo-political arrangements are necessary to set concrete boundaries for each side’s national desires. In addition, both sides would need to do the in-depth psychological work on a collective basis regarding identity and collective fantasies. On the Israeli side it would entail, among other issues, surrendering a sense of ‘historical rights’ to realpolitik, and on the Palestinian side, issues such as transforming an identity of victimhood into self-reliance. In Israel, only a minority of the electorate – as opposed to a majority of the elected, still adhere and demand Greater Israel. The Palestinians, as well, will have to mourn giving up the fantasy of Greater Palestine, replacing Israel. The process of even minimal Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory must be accompanied by cessation of the horrendous incitement in Palestinian media, schools and mosques.

5. In the long run, in order to ensure viability, low-level yet confederative frameworks of cooperation, can be conducive, such as Gaza-Israel-West Bank/Palestinian Authority-Jordan. At some level, cooperative arrangements are already in place.

The critical issue at this time is withdrawal from civilian occupation beyond the big settlement blocs (located along the cease-fire lines), while incremental withdrawal from military occupation when agreements can be reached.

Erel Shalit

A NECESSARY COMPANION TO Ari Shavit's MY PROMISED LAND

By Elizabeth Clark-Stern

Psychiatrist Carl Jung wrote in The Red Book of the distinction between “The Spirit of the Times” and “The Spirit of the Depths”. We see this vividly demonstrated when we put Ari Shavit’s acclaimed new book My Promised Land: The Triumph and Tragedy of Israel alongside Erel Shalit’s classic work, The Hero and His Shadow: Psychopolitical Aspects of Myth and Reality in Israel. The former takes us through the history of the heroic creation of Israel, including the darkest “shadow” behaviors of the Jewish state in the 1948 massacre of the Arabs of Lydda.

In the latter work, Erel Shalit tells us why.

This is no simplistic psychological analysis. The brilliance of this Israeli Jungian analyst is that he offers no easy solutions, plumbing the paradox of the necessary heroic identity of the Jewish state, and yet, around every corner is the shadow of every hero: the beggar, the frightened one, the part of all of us that is dependent on forces outside of our control.

It is also very important to note that Erel Shalit’s book is fascinating reading for anyone interested in the inner workings of the soul. On one level Israel is the backdrop for the author to explore how shadow, myth, and projection work in all of us, regardless of our life circumstance, nationality, environment, or history. It even includes a comprehensive glossary of Jungian terms that has some of the best definitions I have ever encountered, and hence a find for readers new to Jung.

And, of course, for people who are fascinated by the scope and depth of the story of Israel, this is a simply great read. It stands alone, but read as a companion to Ari Shavit’s My Promised Land, Erel Shalit’s Hero and His Shadow gives us The Spirit of the Depths in all its dimension. We may not be able to resolve the Arab/Israeli conflict, but we can learn many things from this brave, complex Israeli author, that we can apply to healing the inner and outer wars in our own lives.

The Moment of Historical Courage is Calling on Netanyahu

The negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority ended, when PA President Abbas quit the talks at the moment of truth. Presented with far-reaching Israeli offers, he turned his back, as he has done before. The settlement freeze that Netanyahu reluctantly accepted at the beginning of Obama’s Presidency to bring the Palestinians to the negotiation table did not lead to anything – anyhow, wouldn’t negotiations in themselves be in the interest of all concerned?

President Abbas (whose term of presidency in fact expired in 2009) took unilateral steps (though I believe Israel should have welcomed the independent Arab State of Palestine), and has now formed a unity government with Hamas. 

One might wonder about the motives of President Obama in favoring terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah as part of governing bodies - naivete, shadow, tactics...?

It must be clear to all that the technocrats provide a façade (or a farce) of legitimacy of a Hamas backed government.

While both these groups explicitly have the destruction of Israel on their agenda, also the charter of Abbas’s Palestine Liberation Organization calls for the end of Israel.

And honestly, when repeatedly declared that peace is possible only with Abbas and no one else on the Palestinian side, I doubt the validity of a one-man peace.

In the absence of democracy, I believe such a Palestinian government is a more truthful reflection of Palestinian sentiments than one-man Abbas. If the different militias are disarmed, the thousands of rockets aimed at Israel are assembled, so that the Palestinian Authority has one security force, not allowing for Hamas, Islamic Jihad and others to carry weapons or fire rockets, this would prove governing (if not elected) authority.

I am no great admirer of Netanyahu either. During the Oslo process, he participated in the incitement that took place against Rabin and the government, and during his terms as PM he repeatedly reaffirmed his right-wing and pro-settlement identity.

While on the one hand he punishes the Palestinians by allowing more building in settlements (much of which will fortunately not materialize, but merely serves as provocation), reports have it that he is contemplating far-reaching unilateral disengagement.

This may be your chance, PM Netanyahu! Unilateral disengagement fell in ill repute after the exit from Gaza, mainly because the illusion was that withdrawal from occupied territory would cause a positive response from the Palestinians, while it caused rains of rockets.

Just like Palestinian unilateral steps don’t bring peace, neither will territorial withdrawal. However, occupying another people, thus preventing the Palestinian Arabs from fully taking responsibility for statehood, causes chronic problems in Israeli society (cf. The Hero and His Shadow, Requiem).

My simple suggestion is thus:

1. Declare the small area along the 1948 ceasefire line in which 80% of settlers live (and which in any peace agreement will be part of a land swap) to be part of Israel,
2. Declare a complete settlement freeze beyond this area, where the majority of settlements, in which however a minority of settlers live – offer settlers who are willing to evacuate the possibility of compensation; the earlier they evacuate, the greater the compensation,
3. Declare willingness to swap land for the areas held on to, at a future negotiated peace, but not until then,
4. Unlike the full withdrawal from Gaza, military occupation (for instance to ensure that rockets are not fired from the West Bank into Israel’s Ben Gurion International airport) will remain until security arrangements and partial or full peace agreements are reached – only the civilian aspects of occupation, that is the settlements, will be evacuated until such times,
5. Declare recognition of an Arab Palestinian State, whether independently in the West Bank and Gaza, or in federation with Jordan, and the willingness to establish joint financial and other projects to make such a state viable, in whatever shape the Palestinians themselves decide.

I am convinced additional creative suggestions can be brought to your attention, Mr. Netanyahu, but do act now to a de facto withdrawal from occupied territory, and divert the enormous waste of financial resources from settlements to affordable housing for the young inside Israel. You have the support of an overwhelming majority of Israel's population, and this will give you a well-deserved place in the annals of the history of modern Israel.